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Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation
Keith N. Hylton ∗
November 2018

Abstract: This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class
actions, with an emphasis on positive value claims. In the multiple victim scenario
with positive value claims, the probability that an individual victim will bring suit falls
toward zero with geometric decay as the number of victims increases. The reason is
that the incentive to free ride increases with the number of victims. Deterrence does
not collapse but is degraded. Undercompliance is observed, which worsens as the
number of victims increases. Compliance is never socially optimal, and the shortfall
from optimality increases with the number of victims. These results, which continue
to hold even if victims anticipate being joined in a single forum, suggest a more nuanced
and potentially more robust justification for the class action than has hitherto been
provided.
Implications for collusive settlements of class action litigation are
discussed.

JEL Classifications: K40, K41, K42, K22, D74
Keywords: class action, aggregate litigation, positive value claims, negative value
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1. Introduction
Rights without remedies have been viewed as anomalies in the law. As a result, the
class action, permitting one or several litigants to sue on behalf of a large group of
victims, developed as a means of providing a remedy in multiple-victim settings where
individual incentives to sue are inadequate.
Class action lawsuits fall into two categories: those consisting of negative expected
value claims, where the expected individual recovery is less than the claimant’s cost of
litigation (for example, consumer claims), and those consisting of positive expected
value claims (for example, securities claims). For negative expected value claims,
aggregation within the class action is necessary to create a suit with a positive expected
value. This has been the fundamental justification for class actions (Coffee 2015). 1
For positive expected value claims, the social desirability of the class action is less clear
because every claimant can profitably bring his own lawsuit. 2 To be sure, the
literature has offered theories to justify positive claim class actions on social welfare
grounds. 3 Still, despite the importance of the topic as evidenced by the passage of two
federal statues regulating class actions, 4 the law and economics literature has given
relatively little attention to the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class
actions. 5
This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions,
1

Posner makes the same point in Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The device is

especially important when each claim is too small to justify the expense of a separate suit, so that
without a class action there would be no relief, however meritorious the claims.” )
2

Most discussions assume risk neutral agents who sue whenever the expected value of the claim is

positive.

If, instead, subjective preferences are taken into account, the welfare effects of both negative

and positive value claim aggregation would be difficult to assess.

Aggregation might benefit those

who would prefer to sue but do not do so because of a lack of information on the existence of a potential
claim, but might injure those who are informed but would prefer not to sue (Eisenberg and Miller, 2004,
at 1529-30).
3

See Spier (2002) and Bone (2003) on efficiency in reducing litigation costs and management of

externalities in limited fund litigation. Rosenberg and Spier (2014) examine incentives to invest in
litigation, and specifically the class action’s ability to equalize investment incentives for plaintiffs and
defendants. Che and Spier (2008) examine settlement pathologies in multiple plaintiff settings with a
fixed cost of litigation shared among plaintiffs.
4

The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

5

Among the relatively few exceptions are Bone (2003) and Ulen (2011).

analyses have tended to focus on ex post settlement incentives.

The formal economic

Che and Spier (2008) examine the

settlement process and discuss implications of their analysis for injurer incentive dilution.

This paper’s

model, by contrast, focuses on ex ante incentive effects, and particularly the influence of litigation costs
(Shavell, 1982; Hylton, 1990).
1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059583

with an emphasis on positive value claims. Its core finding is that in the multiple
victim scenario with positive value claims, the probability of individual suit goes to
zero with geometric decay as the number of victims increases. This is due to strategic
behavior, as the incentive to free ride (that is, wait for another litigant to first establish
liability) increases with the number of victims. Deterrence does not collapse, as in the
case of negative value claims, but is degraded.
Undercompliance is likely and becomes the norm as the number of victims increases.
This is because free riding reduces aggregate liability below aggregate social harm.
The difference can be made up only if the litigation cost burden on the defendant
increases sufficiently with the number of victims. But the litigation cost burden
threatened by any particular victim shrinks to zero in the limit because of free riding.
Compliance with the law is always less than socially optimal, and the shortfall from
social optimality increases with the number of victims. This is a fundamental problem
– again attributable to strategic behavior – that can be solved most effectively through
the class action device. In theory, fee shifting could also solve the underdeterrence
problem, but in reality it is unlikely that any fee shifting scheme could completely
remove the incentive to free ride among victims.
The free riding result holds even if the first-filing victims anticipate joining in a single
action. The reason is that although joinder reduces litigation costs, it does not
eliminate the incentive to free ride and the resultant undercompliance.
Counterintuitively, joinder can actually weaken deterrence under some conditions.
The core results of this paper suggest a more nuanced and potentially more robust
justification for the class action. 6 In addition, the results have implications for the
effectiveness of class action litigation. The problem of collusive “settlements,” where
the class action attorney terminates the action in exchange for a side payment from the
defendant, appears to be governed by the same dynamics as the private litigation
incentive. The incentive to free ride implies that the probability of any individual
plaintiff choosing to monitor approaches zero as the class size expands, and further the
probability of monitoring by any class member falls as the cost of monitoring rises
relative to the individual payout.
I also examine the deterrence properties of litigation and class actions when the award
6

To be sure, the literature examining settlement incentives in the multiple plaintiff setting offers

important justifications for class actions (Spier, 2002, Che and Spier, 2008).
in that literature follow from inefficiencies in the settlement process.

The justifications implied

In this paper, by contrast, the

justification for class actions follows essentially from the problem of free riding in the decision to sue.
In particular, because I find that settlement is precluded by positive transaction costs when the number
of victims is large (because free riding depresses expected liability to the minimum of the settlement
range), the findings here on ex ante incentives are independent of settlement pathologies.
2
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is unequal to the harm, common in the consumer protection field where plaintiffs often
seek statutory damages. Supra-compensatory damages can enhance welfare by
removing the litigation cost hurdle that induces free riding, but can also result in
excessive deterrence. Supra-compensatory damages class actions enhance welfare
only if the award is less than the sum of the harm and the plaintiff’s cost of litigation.
Lastly, I consider the model’s implications for some issues in securities litigation, such
as free riding among institutional investors, opting out, and the likely result of
abolishing securities class actions. The model suggests a method of measuring the
potential compliance value of class actions consisting of positive value claims.
Part 2 presents the basic model. Part 3 examines the effects of private litigation with
multiple victims on incentives to comply with the law and on the social optimality of
compliance.
Part 3 illustrates the geometric decay of deterrence and also
demonstrates that compliance is socially inadequate in the multiple victim private
litigation setting. Part 4 considers the implications of permissive joinder of plaintiffs.
Part 5 discusses extensions and implications of the basic model.
2. Basic Model
There are n > 1 victims. The injurer imposes a loss on each of v, and each faces a
litigation cost cp > 0. The injurer/defendant bears litigation cost cd > 0. The injurer
can take care, incurring a cost of x > 0. If the injurer does not take care, the probability
of injury to each victim is p > 0. If the injurer does take care, the probability of injury
to each victim is q, where p > q.
The injurer has sufficient assets to compensate all of the victims. Liability is strict,
and the injury to each victim arises from a single transaction. 7 Thus, proof of liability
by one victim/plaintiff establishes liability for any other victim. 8 Put in legal terms,
there is one common issue of fact and law (did the injurer comply with the law?) that
the court will consider to determine liability to all victims who sue.
Victims have “negative value claims” if v ≤ cp (victims do not sue when indifferent)
7

Strict liability is associated with many of the areas in which the availability of the class action has

made litigation likely: for example, securities litigation (Section 10b5 securities fraud lawsuits),
consumer fraud (e.g., Truth in Lending Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, etc.), environmental
litigation (e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (also known
as Superfund) ).
8

In legal terms, this model assumes offensive estoppel (issue preclusion): having been found guilty of

the violation in one lawsuit, the defendant is precluded from relitigating liability in a later lawsuit arising
from the same transaction.

On offensive issue preclusion, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.

322 (1979). Che and Yi (1993) examine an asymmetric information model of litigation with issue
preclusion, finding that the first plaintiff can extort a large settlement.
3
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and positive value claims if v > cp. 9 Equivalently, letting λ = cp/v, claims are negative
if λ ≥ 1, and positive if λ < 1. Adopting a parallel notation for defendants, for
simplicity of expression, let θ = cd/v.
2.1. Litigation
Litigation is highly plausible in this scenario because of the transaction costs of settling
numerous claims. Still, it is worthwhile to consider the precise sorts of costs that
obstruct settlement.
First, note that if claims have negative value (λ ≥ 1), no victim will sue, and the injurer
will not take care, which is the traditional justification for class actions. For the
remainder I assume that victims have positive claims.
Second, since the defendant’s total trial cost v+cd exceeds the award v, the defendant
would default unless there were significant costs incurred by doing so. I assume
therefore that the defendant’s cost of default is greater than cd, 10 so that the defendant
will not choose to default when a claim is filed in court.
Litigation results in this model – or, equivalently, settlement does not occur – because
of the peculiar incentives of multiple victims and the transaction costs of settlement.
The transaction costs consist of the costs of negotiation and “holding out” by victims. 11
Consider the following sequence. In the first stage, the injurer decides whether to
make a settlement offer simultaneously, and publicly observable, to all victims. 12 In
the second stage, the victims decide simultaneously and noncooperatively whether to
accept the offer, or to reject and hold out for more. If a victim accepts, the dispute
between the accepting victim and injurer comes to an end. If a victim “holds out,” he
makes a counteroffer to the defendant. In the third stage, the victim’s counteroffer is
accepted by the defendant or the parties proceed to litigation. In the fourth stage, after
having committed to litigation, the victim chooses either to “Sue” or to “Wait,” where
the former strategy involves suing immediately and the latter involves waiting to take
advantage of legal precedent created by an earlier plaintiff. If the victim sues his
payoff is v – cp. If the victim waits and some other victim sues, the waiting victim
9

I assume the lawyer and victim act as a merged entity, so agency costs do not drive a wedge between

the lawyer’s and the victim’s incentive to litigate.
10

There are several plausible interpretations of the default cost.

One is to treat v as the expected

award after consideration of evidence from both parties on damages, where the default cost consists
of an upward bias in v because of the absence of countervailing evidence in default.

Another cost is

to the reputation of a defendant who fails to respond to a court summons.
11

Rave (2013) discusses the holdout problem as a factor driving litigation in the multiple victim setting.

12

Che and Spier (2008) examine discriminating public offers in the multiple plaintiff setting.

and Reinganum (1999) examine private offers.

Daughety

I assume offers are public and common to all.
4
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receives v because he avoids the cost of proving liability. If all victims wait, their
payoffs equal zero, because evidence has grown stale and no prior litigant has used the
evidence to prove the defendant’s violation. Transaction costs prevent victims from
coordinating in advance. 13
Examining pure strategies, there are multiple equilibria in the final period: specifically,
any outcome in which one victim sues and the others wait. Considering (symmetric)
mixed strategies, the victim chooses a probability of suit, a, that equalizes the payoff
from suing, v – cp, and that from waiting. 14 Since waiting has a positive reward only
if some other victim sues, the payoff from waiting is [1-(1-a)n-1]v. The equilibrium
1

suit probability is therefore 𝑎𝑎∗ = 1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 .

Given a*, will the parties settle? The minimum settlement offer is a*(v – cp) + (1- a*)
[1-(1- a*)n-1]v = v – cp. However, because some victims wait, the expected gain from
settlement is small and disappearing with n. 15 Thus, even minimal transaction costs
preclude settlement in the large numbers case. In the small numbers case, given the
offer v – cp, the victim has a weakly dominant strategy to hold out. The injurer could
lessen this incentive by raising the offer, but the victims’ tendency to wait constrains
the scope for such an increase. 16 Modest transaction costs should be sufficient to
eliminate the gain from settlement. Hence, injurers refuse to make offers in the first
stage, resulting in litigation.
Proposition 1: For multiple positive claim victims, the equilibrium probability of suit
1

by a victim is 𝑎𝑎 ∗ = 1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 .

Thus, as the number of victims goes to infinity, each

victim’s probability of suing goes to zero.

This is a version of the “bystander effect,” which explains why the probability of a
bystander coming to the aid of a person in distress falls as the number of bystanders
13

See Bone (2011), which also notes that the incentive to free ride will hinder any effort to

communicate among victims to form the equivalent of a class lawsuit through voluntary joinder.
14

Symmetry is easy to justify given that the victims are the same.

admittedly not as straightforward.

Justifying mixed strategies is

With respect to individual incentives, it is plausible that a lawyer

would have an incentive to randomize because a pure strategy of suing every time would induce the
other lawyers to free ride, see Reinganum (2008).

An alternative justification is the following selection

argument: if all lawyers sue immediately, then some lawyers could gain by waiting, and thus there would
be some percentage of “waiters” at which the expected profit advantage from waiting fully dissipates.
Finally, the mixed strategy assumption generates simple and plausible comparative statics that are
consistent with more complex pure strategy analyses of the public-good-provision problem at the base
of this paper, see Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996).
15

See appendix, part A.

16

Id.
5
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increases (Darley and Latane, 1968; Diekmann, 1985; Leshem and Tabbach, 2016).
Here, the victim, deciding when to sue, focuses only on the payoff from suing
immediately relative to that for waiting. For any given suit probability, the payoff
from waiting increases with the number of victims. In the limit, this incentive to free
ride causes the individual suit probability to go to zero.
2.2. Effect of Change in Award or Cost
As one would expect, the equilibrium individual suit probability is decreasing in the
plaintiff’s cost of litigation. 17 In addition, the larger is the plaintiff’s litigation cost
(provided it is less than the award), the smaller is the negative impact of its increase on
the equilibrium suit probability. 18 This is intuitive given the existence of a limit where
the plaintiff’s cost is equal to the award, beyond which suits will not be brought. As
the cost approaches the award, the sensitivity of the equilibrium suit probability to
changes in the cost tapers off.
The equilibrium suit probability increases with the award. 19 This positive effect
increases with the size of the award and decreases with the plaintiff’s litigation cost.
Not surprisingly in view of the free rider incentive, as the number of victims increases,
the sensitivity of the equilibrium suit probability to changes in either the award or the
litigation cost goes to zero.
2.3 Expected Liability
The question generated by the finding that the individual suit probability goes to zero
is whether deterrence collapses in the same manner. If the injurer’s expected liability
decays as strongly as the individual suit probability then deterrence would inevitably
collapse, and the justification for class actions in the positive value setting would be
indistinguishable from that in the negative value setting. However, deterrence is a
function of both the individual suit probability and the number of victims.
The injurer’s expected liability is 20
∗
17 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

18

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝

=�

−1

𝑛𝑛−1

1

1

� 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � � < 0

This is because

𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝

𝜕𝜕 2 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝

2

which is positive for n > 2, and zero for n = 2.
∗
19 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

20

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

=�

1

𝑛𝑛−1

1

1
𝑛𝑛 − 2
1
� 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � 2 �
2
(𝑛𝑛 − 1)
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝

=�

1

� 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � � > 0
𝑣𝑣

This answer can be arrived at intuitively, since the injurer avoids liability only in the outcome where

everyone waits.

The laborious route is as follows:

𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) = � � 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ) + � � 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ) + ⋯ + �
� 𝑎𝑎1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ) + (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛 ∙ 0
0
1
𝑛𝑛 − 1

6
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𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ] + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎 ∗

(1)

The first term reflects the discount on expected liability due to free riding and the
second captures the total expected defense cost.
Substituting the equilibrium suit probability,
𝑛𝑛

1

𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �.
As the number of victims increases,
𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) → 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝜆𝜆) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 �.
First, this is central to the argument of the previous part that litigation is plausible
because of free riding. Second, even though the probability of litigation by an
individual goes to zero as the victim pool increases, expected liability remains positive
because it depends on the probability that at least one will sue, which falls but stabilizes
at 1-λ.
Holding fixed the number of victims, expected liability shrinks to zero as the ratio of
the plaintiff’s cost to the award gets closer to one. This cost-induced deterrence
collapse occurs more rapidly as the number of victims increases. 21
Expected liability increases as the award increases, both because of the direct effect and
because of the indirect effect of increasing the probability of suit. Expected liability
falls as the plaintiff’s litigation cost increases, because of the effect on the probability
of suit.
Given the obstacles to settlement noted earlier, why wouldn’t the defendant pay off
claims for full value by committing to a claims resolution facility (Ayres, 1990)? If
the defendant could credibly commit not to defend claims, then the litigation cost

𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
= 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛 ] + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 �𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1) � � 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎) + (𝑛𝑛 − 2) � � 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−2 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)2 + ⋯ + �
� 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 �
1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
2

𝑛𝑛 − 1 𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝑛𝑛 − 1 𝑛𝑛−2
= 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛 ] + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + �
� 𝑎𝑎 (1 − 𝑎𝑎) + �
� 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 �
� 𝑎𝑎 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)2 + ⋯ + �
1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
2

which is equal to the expression for expected liability in the text.
21

This follows from
1
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐿𝐿)
−𝑛𝑛
=�
� �𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � 𝜆𝜆�𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 � < 0,
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑛𝑛 − 1

which increases in absolute value with n.
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7

barrier in the way of victims becoming plaintiffs would disappear. Since the threat of
litigation deters claims by maintaining the plaintiff’s litigation cost hurdle, a necessary
and sufficient condition for litigation to be rational for the defendant is nv > E(L). 22
Substituting the equilibrium suit probability, litigation is rational if
𝑛𝑛

1

𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 > 𝜃𝜃 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �

(2)

which is plausible for small n and sure to hold for large n.
3. Compliance Incentives
Since deterrence does not collapse because of free riding, the remaining question is
whether it is impaired. This part considers first the question of perfect compliance
with the legal standard, and second the question of socially optimal compliance.
3.1 Perfect Compliance versus Socially Optimal Compliance
The equilibrium outcome is one of perfect compliance (or perfect deterrence, or firstbest deterrence) if all injurers for whom
𝑥𝑥 < (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

(3)

choose to take care. This standard, which compares the cost of compliance to the
social harm to victims directly resulting from noncompliance, is exemplified by the
Hand Formula in tort law and other fault-based tests throughout the law.
Given that litigation is costly, socially optimal compliance (or deterrence) occurs when,
given a*,
𝑥𝑥 < (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛[𝑣𝑣 + 𝑎𝑎∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 )]

(4)

In plain terms, compliance is socially optimal whenever the cost of compliance is less
than the marginal social cost of failing to comply, taking into account the expected cost
of litigation.
3.1.1 Perfect Compliance
An equilibrium of perfect compliance incentives holds when the social harm from
noncompliance is the same as the expected liability from noncompliance:
22

This assumes that the claims resolution facility is costless and compensates in full.

In reality, such

facilities are not costless and do not compensate perfectly, which can distort compliance incentives
(Ayres, 1990).
8
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(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ] + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎 ∗ }

(5)

Undercompliance results if marginal social harm (left side) is greater than marginal
liability, and overcompliance if the inequality is reversed. This implies:
Proposition 2: Undercompliance worsens with the number of victims and eventually
becomes the norm as the number of victims gets large. If the injurer can commit to a
claims resolution facility (and therefore threaten litigation only when it is rational
because aggregate harm exceeds expected liability), then overcompliance is never an
equilibrium.
The proof of this is straightforward. Simplifying (5) and substituting the equilibrium
suite probability, undercompliance results if condition (2) holds, and (2) holds more
strongly as the number of victims increases.
Undercompliance is due to free riding, whose effect might be mitigated if the litigation
cost burden on the defendant could make up for the dilution of liability. But given the
vanishing likelihood of individual suit, the litigation cost burden cannot make up for
the dilution due to free riding.
From (5), the frontier along which incentives align with the legal standard (perfect
compliance) is
𝑛𝑛

𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1

1−

1
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1

= 𝜃𝜃

which is shown in the Figure 1 simulations below. The zone below the frontier is of
undercompliance, and above the frontier, overcompliance. If the defendant can
costlessly commit to a claims resolution facility, the overcompliance zone would
instead represent perfect compliance. The simulations illustrate the rapid decay in
compliance as the number of victims increases.

9
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Figure 1: Compliance Effects of Litigation as the Number of Victims Increases
Notes: Horizontal axis: 0 < λ < 1; vertical axis: 0 < θ < 10. Area below curve
represents undercompliance zone, above represents overcompliance.
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3.1.2 Socially Optimal Compliance
For compliance to be socially optimal, the marginal social cost from noncompliance,
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 𝑛𝑛[𝑣𝑣 + 𝑎𝑎∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 )] , must equal marginal liability, (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 −
𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ] + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗ }. Since the former is greater than the latter this result cannot hold.
Thus:
Proposition 3: Compliance is always less than socially optimal. This is because
marginal liability is always less than the marginal social cost of noncompliance. The
degree to which compliance falls short of social optimality increases with the number
of victims.
The reason is that the injurer does not expect to pay for all of the harms, given the
incentive to wait on the part of victims, and also externalizes litigation costs to
plaintiffs. 23 This is similar to the result that strict liability underdeters relative to the
social optimum when litigation is costly (Hylton, 1990). However, the strict liability
underdeterrence result is due to the fact that litigation costs erect a barrier to some
victims by creating negative value claims. Here, litigation costs do not erect a barrier
to any victim, because each has a positive claim. It is the strategic interactions among
victims that generates social underdeterrence.
Underdeterence potentially could be solved by shifting the plaintiff’s costs to the
defendant. If such a shift were possible, then there would be no gain to a victim in
playing the “wait” strategy. All victims would sue, and the marginal social harm from
noncompliance would be equal to marginal liability. 24
Calculating the welfare loss from socially suboptimal compliance would require
information on the distribution of the compliance cost. 25 However, since the welfare
loss increases with the wedge between marginal liability and marginal social cost,
which is (p-q)ncp, the loss due to free riding can be attributed generally to three factors:
the productivity of care, the size of the victim pool, and the plaintiff’s cost of litigation.

23

Proposition 3 is obviously true in the negative-value claim scenario, so there is no need to limit its

scope to the positive-claim scenario.
24

There is a separate issue as to whether suit should be barred in order to enhance social welfare.

If

expected litigation costs exceed the marginal deterrence benefit, then it may be optimal to bar litigation
(Shavell, 1982).
25

Let the distribution be G(x) with corresponding density g; let 𝑥𝑥 be the cutoff value equal to marginal

liability, (5); and let 𝑥𝑥 be the cutoff value equal to marginal social cost of noncompliance, (4).

The

welfare loss due to suboptimal compliance is
𝑥𝑥

�[(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛[𝑣𝑣 + 𝑎𝑎∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 )] − 𝑥𝑥 ]𝑔𝑔(𝑥𝑥)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑥𝑥
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3.2 Example: Two Victims
For two victims, A and B, the two pure strategy equilibria involve A suing and B waiting,
or vice versa. For the mixed strategy, if A sues his payoff is v – cp, and if he waits his
payoff is 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 ; thus 𝑎𝑎 ∗ = 1 − 𝜆𝜆 . Perfect compliance equates expected harm and
expected liability, 1 = [(1 − 𝜆𝜆2 ) + 𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜆𝜆)], or 𝜃𝜃 =

𝜆𝜆2

1−𝜆𝜆

.

This is the curve in

the upper left of Figure 1, showing the balance between over and undercompliance
incentives for different parameter values.
4. Joinder of Plaintiffs
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 provides that plaintiffs may join in one action if
“(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in
the action.”
Ex post (i.e., after suit is filed), permissive joinder advantages plaintiffs by reducing
their joint litigation expenses. 26 Joinder also reduces defendant’s expenses. These
effects have complicated implications for incentives. First, from the defendant’s
perspective, joinder may not be desirable ex ante because it encourages the filing of
lawsuits. It would seem that joinder should always be beneficial to plaintiffs ex ante,
but it is not necessarily so. By reducing defendant’s expenses, joinder may weaken
deterrence, harming plaintiffs. When the number of victims is large, however, the
joinder and non-joinder policies have similar implications for the probability that an
individual victim will sue.
4.1 Probability of Suit with Joinder of Plaintiffs
Proposition 4: Even with the prospect of joinder, the individual probability of suit
approaches zero as the number of victims increases.
Thus, the free rider incentive remains under joinder, and the probability of individual
suit declines as the number of victims increases. The reason is that although joinder
reduces the plaintiffs’ litigation costs dramatically, it does not eliminate the incentive
to wait to allow another victim to establish precedent. Even with permissive joinder
of plaintiffs, the victim who waits to file after liability has been established by the first
litigants gains. As long as there is an advantage to playing the “wait” strategy,
deterrence is compromised. Next, I compare expected liability under joinder and
non-joinder.
26

Given the ex post advantage to plaintiffs, one could interpret the previous analysis of incentives

under non-joinder as assuming that transaction costs prevent the plaintiffs from opting for joinder.
12
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4.2 Expected Liability with Joinder of Plaintiffs
Comparing expected liability with joinder to the expectation where there is no
joinder, 27
𝐸𝐸�𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 � = (1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 )(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 )

𝐸𝐸�𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 � = 𝑛𝑛[𝑣𝑣(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎 ∗ )𝑛𝑛 ) + 𝑎𝑎∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ]

where 𝑎𝑎� is the equilibrium probability of suit given that plaintiffs join and 𝑎𝑎∗ is the
equilibrium probability of suit given that plaintiffs do not join. Looking at the two
expressions, it is unclear whether joinder of plaintiffs advantages defendants by
reducing expected liability – that is, whether E(Lj) < E(Lnj).
Just as in the non-joinder scenario examined previously, expected liability does not
collapse in the joinder scenario as the number of victims increases, even though the
probability of individual suit approaches zero. Substituting the equilibrium suit
probability in the non-joinder scenario, non-joinder advantages defendants ex ante if
𝑛𝑛

1

(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 )(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ) > 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �
or equivalently,

𝜃𝜃
+
𝑛𝑛 + 𝜃𝜃

𝑛𝑛

1

𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 − 𝜃𝜃 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �
𝜃𝜃
1 + 𝑛𝑛

> (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛

which may or may not hold. 28 Thus, it is possible that joinder of plaintiffs could
advantage injurers, and thereby reduce social welfare.
Next, I offer an illustration with two victims of the conflict between the ex ante and
ex post joinder preferences of injurers. The illustration shows that the comparison
between expected liability under joinder and non-joinder is generally ambiguous,
depending on the ratio of the plaintiff’s cost to the award and the ratio of the
27

The derivation of E(Lj) starts with the observation that

𝑛𝑛
𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 ) = �𝑛𝑛0�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ) + �𝑛𝑛1�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ) + ⋯ + �𝑛𝑛−1
�𝑎𝑎1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ).
28

As n goes to infinity, non-joinder advantages defendants (relative to joinder) if 𝜆𝜆 > 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 ,

which may or may not hold, see appendix proposition 4.

𝑛𝑛→∞
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defendant’s cost to the award.
4.3 Example: Joinder with Two Victims
For two victims, expected liability under the joinder and non-joinder policies are E(Lj)
= (1-(1-𝑎𝑎�)2)(2v+cd) and E(Lnj) = 2[v(1-(1-a*)2)+a*cd] respectively, where 𝑎𝑎�
= 2(1-λ)/(2-λ) and a* = 1 – λ. The frontier of (λ, θ) values for which the defendant is
indifferent ex ante regarding joinder and non-joinder is the boundary of the shaded
region in Figure 2. Within the shaded region, non-joinder is optimal ex ante for the
defendant. 29 In the white region, joinder is optimal ex ante for defendants, which
could reduce welfare. The implication is that where the defendant’s litigation costs
are high relative to the plaintiff’s, joinder of plaintiffs likely advantages defendants
and can weaken compliance incentives relative to non-joinder.

Figure 2: Ex ante versus ex post joinder incentives

4.3 Compliance under Joinder of Plaintiffs
Here I consider perfect compliance and socially optimal compliance under joinder.
Recall that undercompliance worsens and becomes the norm as the number of victims
increases in the non-joinder setting.

29

E(Lj) > E(Lnj) in the regions
0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 2 − √2

2 − √2 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜃𝜃 < −

𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜃𝜃 > −

(3 − 𝜆𝜆) ∙ 𝜆𝜆2
𝜆𝜆2 − 4𝜆𝜆 + 2
(3 − 𝜆𝜆) ∙ 𝜆𝜆2
𝜆𝜆2 − 4𝜆𝜆 + 2

Given that the boundary of the second region is to the right of λ = 1 for positive θ, Figure 2 provides a
sufficient picture of the relevant region.
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In the joinder setting, victims are more likely to bring suit, which could improve
compliance.

Under joinder, compliance is less than perfect if 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 𝐸𝐸�𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 �, or
(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 >

𝜃𝜃
𝑛𝑛 + 𝜃𝜃

which holds as n gets large. 30 Thus, similar to Proposition 2, undercompliance
worsens and becomes the norm as the number of victims increases. Although
joinder of plaintiffs may improve deterrence in some small numbers settings, the free
rider incentive eventually overwhelms the plaintiff cost-reduction effect. Again, if
the injurer can commit to a claims resolution facility, overcompliance will not occur.
Consider the question of socially optimal compliance. It follows from the foregoing
that social optimality is possible in the small numbers setting, but becomes less and
less likely as the number of victims increases. The shortfall from optimality worsens
with the number of victims.
5. Extensions
5.1 Limited Fund Litigation
The basic model (2.1) assumes that the defendant has sufficient funds to compensate
all victims. In “limited fund” cases, by contrast, there are multiple victims against a
defendant with a fund insufficient to compensate all of them (Spier, 2002; Miceli and
Segerson, 2005). The standard presumption is that victims race to the courthouse,
resulting in unequal levels of compensation (Bone, 2003). 31 If there is only enough
to compensate m < n, and k < m sue, then waiting could be advantageous if v-cp < (mk)v/(n-k), though the standard race returns as n increases. This suggests, consistent
with Miceli and Segerson, waiting (here, free riding) could occur in the limited fund
setting, 32 especially if the fund size correlates with the number of victims. Products
liability claims exhibit this trait because the fund for compensation is likely to
correlate with the number of victims who purchase the product. 33
30

The left hand side of the inequality does not go to zero (appendix, proposition 4), while the right

hand side does go to zero.
31

Spier (2002), in a careful examination of limited fund litigation, focuses on settlement incentives and

finds that externalities among plaintiffs can result in socially inefficient litigation.

For two plaintiffs, a

race to the collect defendant’s assets in settlement occurs only when the correlation between their
claims is low. When the correlation is high, settlement is less likely in the Spier model.
32

Miceli and Segerson (2005), examining tort suits for exposure, find that waiting can occur in

equilibrium in the limited fund scenario, where the first wave of exposure suits does not threaten to
wipe out the defendant’s assets.
33

Victims in these cases are similar to bank depositors whose withdrawals do not threaten the bank’s
15
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5.2 Class Actions and Social Optimality
The class action emerges naturally as a potential solution to the shortfall in deterrence.
The class action solves the free riding problem by binding all of the victims into one
litigation unit. 34
One alternative to the class action is litigation cost shifting. If all of the litigation
costs borne by victims are shifted to the injurer, then no victim will have an incentive
to free ride on the litigation of other victims. However, it would be impossible to
shift all of the costs borne by the plaintiff to the defendant. As long as plaintiffs bear
some special costs in litigating early, the strategic incentive to wait will remain.
Another alternative to the class action would a memoryless court system in which
late-filing victims/plaintiffs would be compelled to relitigate issues even against
defendants who would rather settle. This would eliminate the free rider incentive,
but it would be infeasible.
Consider the welfare potential of the class action. Although I have assumed all
victims have positive claims, I relax this assumption here. Suppose the loss for each
victim is the same and governed by the probability density h(v). Since victims bring
suit only when v > cp, the marginal social harm from failing to comply is (assuming
the class action is not available)
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 𝑛𝑛�𝐸𝐸(𝑣𝑣) + 𝑎𝑎∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 ��1 − 𝐻𝐻�𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 ��}
and marginal liability is

solvency even though its funds are limited, so that bank runs as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) are
unlikely.

Breast implant litigation (e.g., Butler v. Mentor Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods.

Liab. Litig.), MDL-926) and bone screw litigation (e.g., Fanning v. AcroMed Corporation , MDL–1014)
provide illustrations.
34

In theory, permissive joinder might mitigate the free rider problem if courts denied offensive

estoppel to late-filing plaintiffs who played the “wait” strategy, as suggested in Parklane Hosiery, 439
U.S. at 330.

However, this would not eliminate free riding.

First, as a preliminary matter, Parklane

Hosiery appears to deny offensive estoppel to the late-filing plaintiff only when he has waited for the
purpose of having two bites at the apple, intending to bring his own claim if the first one fails.

The

plaintiff who waits simply to wait is not such an opportunistic plaintiff under the theory of Parklane
Hosiery.

Decisions after Parklane Hosiery have recognized exceptions to its suggested limit on

offensive estoppel.

Second, and more importantly, if the defendant knows the outcome of later

litigation (i.e., that he will lose) he will settle the follow-on suits, which would induce free riding,
whatever the rule on offensive estoppel.
16
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(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑣𝑣|𝑣𝑣 > 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 )[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ] + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎 ∗ }[1 − 𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 )].

Clearly, marginal social harm remains larger than marginal liability, as in the previous
analysis that assumed positive value claims. Availability of the class action alters
marginal liability to
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑣𝑣|𝑣𝑣 >
and alters marginal social harm to

𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
) + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 }[1 − 𝐻𝐻 � �]
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛

𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) �𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(𝑣𝑣) + (𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 + 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 ) ∙ [1 − 𝐻𝐻 � �]�
𝑛𝑛

While, under the class action device, marginal liability is still smaller than marginal
social harm for any given number of victims, the ratio of the two approaches one as
the number of victim increases. It should be clear that the positive claims scenario is
a special case and conforms. This suggests that the class action is the only feasible
solution to the welfare loss due to free riding. 35
This argument also suggests a limitation. Free riding is likely where positive value
plaintiffs are alike. Thus, a rule policing class actions for commonality, as in WalMart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), could serve to limit class actions to settings
where the deterrence benefit is most probable.
5.2 The Monitoring Problem
An important weakness in the class action device is that a lawyer managing such a
suit may have an incentive to take a side payment from the defendant to “settle” (i.e.,
terminate) the case for a small or trivial payout to the class (Koniak 1995, Macey and
Miller 1991). 36 This problem is especially likely for negative-claim classes. For
example, suppose the plaintiff’s cost of litigation is $11 and each of 100 victims has
suffered a loss of $10. No victim would sue on his own. The total class claim is
$1000. Since the issues of fact and law are common within the class, the total class
litigation cost is only $11. The lawyer, however, might choose to “settle” the case
35

Awarding supra-compensatory (punitive) damages to the first group of litigants could be another way

to blunt the free riding incentive.

If the punitive component is at least as large as the cost of litigation,

no victims would gain by waiting.

However, since courts award punitive damages only in special cases

of malicious or reckless conduct, this approach to correcting incentives would fail to blunt free riding in
the general case.
36

In addition, a judge who must approve the settlement of a certified class may not have a strong

incentive to reject a collusive settlement, given that any settlement reduces the court’s workload
(Helland and Klick, 2007).
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for a side payment of $200, and an award to the class of only $20.
Indeed, the defendant and the plaintiff’s lawyer can always maximize their joint
utility by arranging a side payment to terminate the case – that is, a collusive
settlement. Thus, if no one monitors the class lawyer, the lawyer’s optimal strategy
is to take a side payment from the defendant. More generally the probability of a
side payment occurring is likely to be the complement of the probability of
monitoring: P(side payment) = 1 – P(monitoring).
To prevent a collusive settlement, some member of the class must therefore monitor
the lawyer. But any such monitor would incur costs to oversee the lawyer while
receiving the same benefits as other class members. Class members would therefore
free ride on the monitor.
The structure of the class action monitoring game is the same as that of the positive
value litigation game analyzed in Part 2. Consider, for example, a class consisting of
two victims/plaintiffs, with monitoring cost cm.

A’s
Choice

B’s Choice
Monitor
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚
Monitor
𝑣𝑣 − −
, 𝑣𝑣 − −
2
2
2
2
𝑐𝑐
𝑐𝑐
Don’t
𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 − , 𝑣𝑣 − − 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚
Monitor
2
2

Don’t Monitor
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 − − 𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚 , 𝑣𝑣 −
2
2
0,0

More specifically, this structure is the same as in Proposition 4.
𝜎𝜎 =

For n plaintiffs, let

𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑛𝑛

which is the ratio of the cost of monitoring to the payoff to a class member.
Using the same argument as for Proposition 4, the equilibrium monitoring probability
within the class, 𝑎𝑎�, satisfies
𝜎𝜎[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 ] = 𝑎𝑎�[(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛−1 ]𝑛𝑛

As the number of plaintiffs within the class increases, the equilibrium probability of a
class member choosing to monitor the class attorney approaches zero. 37 However,
the equilibrium probability that monitoring occurs is the probability that at least one
37

This follows from applying the argument in Proposition 4.
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member of the class chooses to monitor. This does not fall to zero, but converges to
a value less than one. Importantly, the probability of monitoring increases as the
ratio of the cost of monitoring to the individual payoff from the class action, σ,
decreases. 38
If the claims are all negative value, the collapse of the class action (due to collusive
settlement) that results because of the absence of monitoring would leave the
plaintiffs with no other recourse. Their individual claims are worthless. If the
claims are all positive value, the collapse of the class action does not deprive the
victims of the alternative of pursuing their claims individually. But this returns us to
Proposition 1: as the number of victims increases, the incentive to pursue individual
positive-value claims falls to zero. A more general proposition emerges: as the
number of victims expands, the probability of individual actions falls to zero,
degrading deterrence, and the probability of an effective class action weakens, also
degrading deterrence. 39
Monitoring can be restored if the monitor receives an additional payment out of the
class award to compensate him for the costs of monitoring. 40 However, if it is the
class action lawyer who permits the monitor to receive the award, then incentives for
monitoring remain poor. The class action lawyer has no incentive to fund an
independent monitor. The lawyer would prefer to appoint a monitor who will give
him maximal freedom to take a side payment if he deems such an action desirable. 41
38

Letting q = (1 - 𝑎𝑎�)n, the equilibrium monitoring probability condition can be expressed as:
1

𝜎𝜎(1 − 𝑞𝑞)(1 − 𝑞𝑞 𝑛𝑛 ) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛

𝑛𝑛+1
𝑛𝑛

Since dq/dσ > 0, the probability that at least one plaintiff within the class monitors, 1-q, falls as σ
increases.
39

The dilution of deterrence described here does not imply that class actions will not be observed.

Such lawsuits will continue, but with many ending in collusive settlements.

Because the per-victim

payoff is lower for negative-claim classes than for positive-claim classes, monitoring is less likely in
negative-claim classes.

Unmonitored class actions are likely to serve a transfer rather than deterrence

function.
40

On the efficiency of rewards as a solution to the “volunteer’s dilemma”, see Leshem and Tabbach

(2016).
41

Macey and Miller (1991) propose an auction of the class action right, with the lowest bidder

prevailing as appointed counsel, to solve the agency cost problem described here.

While such an

auction has an appealing simplicity, it would still generate some problems, as noted in Bebchuk (2002).
The winning bidder may have erroneously underbid (winner’s curse), or may be ill prepared or
inadequately motivated to secure a large judgment.

Moreover, the initial discovery and framing of a

class action may require considerable effort on the part of an attorney.

If the right is then auctioned

off, after an attorney has developed the claim, it is unclear how the originating attorney will be
compensated for his effort, and whether such compensation would be sufficient to encourage future
development of claims.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 changed the law in
19

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3059583

5.3 Damages Unequal to Harm
Another potential flaw in the class action device arises where the court award exceeds
the harm. In some cases victims who have suffered no harm, or very little harm, can
obtain statutory damages and pursue class action litigation (Johnston, 2017).
Statutory damages provisions are often included in consumer protection statutes. In
other cases, the victim pool includes individuals who suffered no harm (Brickman,
2008).
The deterrence implications of aggregate litigation with awards unequal to harm can
be examined within the basic model set out previously. Consider the scenario of
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝
individual lawsuits. Let D be the damages award for each victim, 𝜆𝜆̃ = 𝐷𝐷 < 1, and
𝑣𝑣

let 𝜋𝜋 = 𝐷𝐷 be the ratio of the harm to the award.

this scenario.

The free rider incentive remains in

However, the following deterrence result holds.

Proposition 5: Compliance is socially optimal if and only if the award is equal to the
sum of the plaintiff’s harm and litigation cost (𝜆𝜆̃ + 𝜋𝜋 = 1), excessive if greater (𝜆𝜆̃ +
𝜋𝜋 < 1), and inadequate if less (𝜆𝜆̃ + 𝜋𝜋 > 1).

Damages that precisely compensate for harm is the special case where π = 1, and
compliance is socially inadequate as shown previously. Undercompensation of harm
(π >1) clearly results in inadequate compliance too. Since the no-harm case has π =
0, it follows that incentives to comply are socially excessive when there is no harm, 42
the opposite of the underdeterrence result established under the assumption that the
award equals harm. The class action device only worsens the excessive compliance
securities litigation to require federal judges to appoint lead plaintiffs – on the theory that a judgeappointed lead plaintiff would be more effective as a monitor than one chosen exclusively by the
attorney (Choi, Fisch, Pritchard 2005).

However, even a court-appointed monitor would be afflicted

by the free riding incentive and therefore shirk.

The empirical evidence indicates that among post-

PSLRA lead plaintiffs, only public pension funds appear to achieve above average results (Choi, Fisch,
Pritchard, 2005).

This raises the question whether such funds are able to secure a greater private

benefit from class action participation than other investors (Webber, 2010).
42

Many of the class actions seeking disclosure or internal monitoring fall in the “no-harm” category,

with a remedy that amounts to a positive award to the lawyers.

In In Re Subway Footlong Sandwich

Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 16-1652 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017), the Seventh Circuit rejected a class
action settlement awarding $525,000 to the attorneys.

The lawsuit asserted Subway had harmed

consumers by selling “Footlong Sandwiches” that sometimes fell short of 12 inches.

The Seventh

Circuit concluded that the lawsuit yielded no benefit to consumers, who had not been harmed by
Subway’s practices.

For a skeptical analysis of disclosure class actions in merger litigation, see In Re

Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Del.Ch., 129 A.3d 884 (2016).
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problem in the no-harm scenario.
When 𝜆𝜆̃ + 𝜋𝜋 = 1, the real harm suffered by a prospective litigant is equal to the
damages award, so that the award effectively removes the litigation cost hurdle that
induces free riding. Generally, the class action can enhance welfare in the case
where compliance is socially inadequate. Thus, even when the award exceeds harm,
the class action may still be socially desirable if the excess amount is less than the
plaintiff’s litigation cost (Figure 3).

Negative value

𝜆𝜆̃

Positive value

𝜆𝜆̃=1

π=0

Class action
increases
welfare

𝜆𝜆̃+π=1

Class action
decreases
welfare
Overcompensation

π =1

Undercompensation

π

Figure 3: Class actions with awards unequal to harm

5.4 Application to Securities Litigation
Securities litigation is a straightforward application for this model because positive
value securities claims (e.g., fraud) available to multiple victims are not unusual.
Most shareholders would have negative value claims, but institutional investors are
likely to have positive value claims. Moreover, free riding is potentially serious
among institutional investors. 43 Webber (2015) describes incentives of institutional
investors to assume lead plaintiff status in class actions:
Fidelity, Vanguard, and TIAA-CREF are some of the largest
institutional investors in the world, and undoubtedly have enough
exposure to obtain lead-plaintiff appointments if they pursue them. But
43

On free riding incentives among the major institutional investors (Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street

Global Advisors), see Bebchuk and Hirst (2018).
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they don’t. First, such funds are concerned about the cost of freeriding
competitors, who are also likely to be class members….Hedge funds
also avoid the lead-plaintiff role due to freeriding concerns. In
addition, hedge funds tend to be secretive about their trading strategies
and, thus, may be reluctant to subject themselves to the type of
discovery that lead plaintiffs typically endure.
The same free riding would distort incentives of institutional investors to sue in the
absence of the class action device. In view of the free riding incentive, this paper’s
results – specifically the geometric decay shown in Figure 1 – suggest that if the class
action device were not available the likelihood of undercompliance with securities
laws would worsen with the size of the claimant pool.
Take E(L)/nv = 1 + θ - (λ+θ)λ1/(n-1) as a simple measure of compliance efficiency. If λ
= θ = ½, then moving from three institutional investors to six reduces compliance
efficiency from .79 to .62, that is, by 21 percent.
5.4.1 Positive Theory of Opting Out
Observers of class action litigation have noted that opting out of securities class
actions by positive claimants has occurred more frequently, leaving the class
consisting of negative claims (Coffee, 2015). 44 The positive claims are large
institutional shareholders, with multimillion dollar anticipated awards. The decision
to opt out typically occurs after a tentative settlement of the class action has been
reached. The negative claim class left behind by opt-out litigants is vulnerable to the
monitoring problem: no victim has an incentive to monitor, so the lawyer is likely to
enter into a collusive settlement.
This model suggests that opting out reflects a type of symbiosis between positive and
negative claim subclasses. Recall that, holding the cost of monitoring fixed,
monitoring is more likely as the individual payoff increases. The entire combined
class moves first, securing the outlines of a settlement through the monitoring of
positive claimants, who then peel off to demand better terms. Their ability to
demand better terms is facilitated by the negative claimants’ credible threat to bring a
class action. 45 If the class action were barred, the negative claims would never be
credible, and the positive claimants would then each face the strategic game of
choosing whether to sue immediately or wait for some other claimant to sue first –
44

Che (1996) shows that the economics of opting out are potentially more complicated than the

adverse selection account.

Pure adverse selection, leading to positive value claims opting out, is

observed in Che’s model only when defendants have complete information on plaintiff claims.
45

For example, the negative claims enhance the likelihood of satisfying the “superiority” requirement

for certification – that is, that a class action be superior to other methods of suit, see Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).
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that is, the scenario of Proposition 1 – with the resultant shortfall in deterrence.
5.4.2 Additional Implications
If the class action were abolished in securities litigation, the positive claimants,
institutional investors, might still be compelled to sue because of their fiduciary duty
to clients (Webber, 2015). But each firm might defend a decision not to sue
immediately on the ground that waiting could lead to a better return for clients than
suing immediately. This implies that the decay process modeled here would be
observed in spite of the fiduciary duty. Indeed, the fact that securities litigation is
almost never seen anywhere in the world in the absence of a class action device is
evidence in support of the hypothesis.
The basic model of this paper assumes that some degree of compliance with the law is
socially desirable. In the securities field, this is admittedly an empirical question.
If compliance is not socially desirable (e.g., no one is harmed), social welfare could
be enhanced by prohibiting securities litigation, including class actions (Kraakman,
Park, Shavell 1994). Even if some degree of compliance is socially desirable, if the
cost of litigation is sufficiently high it may be socially preferable to prohibit litigation
(Shavell, 1982). However, if such litigation enhances welfare up to a point, then its
disuse or abandonment by victims obviously could be socially undesirable.
6. Conclusion
This paper shows that in the multiple victim scenario where the victims have positive
expected value claims, the probability of an individual suit collapses with geometric
decay as the number of victims increases. This is because of the incentive to free
ride, which increases with the number of victims. In spite of this, the incentive to
comply with the law does not collapse (as in the negative value claims scenario),
though it is degraded. Undercompliance results, and becomes more severe as the
number of victims increases. Compliance is always less than socially optimal.
Permissive joinder of plaintiffs, even if it were possible in large numbers, cannot
improve on these outcomes. These findings suggest that the class action device may
be the only feasible solution to inefficient undercompliance in the multiple victim
scenario. However, the very same strategic incentives that suggest that the class
action may be socially preferable for deterrence purposes also suggest that class
actions are inherently vulnerable to terminating in collusive settlements.
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Appendix
A. Scope for settlement. Assume positive transaction costs. If n(v – cp) < E(L),
then the injurer, given a choice to settle or litigate, would prefer to settle with each
victim for v – cp. This condition holds because
𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 � < 𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿)
𝑛𝑛

1

𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 � < 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � + 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �
1

0 < (𝜃𝜃 + 𝜆𝜆) �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �

(A1)

But the right hand side goes to zero as n approaches infinity, so E(L) approaches n(v –
cp), and the gain from settlement diminishes geometrically with the number of
victims. Minimal transaction costs would therefore preclude settlement in the large
numbers case, and unable to gain from settlement the injurer would not make an offer.
Now consider the small numbers case. Given the offer v – cp, the victim has a
weakly dominant strategy to hold out for the settlement surplus. To reduce holdouts
the injurer could raise the offer to v – cp + δ, at which holding out would no longer be
weakly dominant for the victim. But the scope for such an offer is constrained – for
example, if n = 8, λ = θ = ½, the total surplus as a percentage of aggregate harm (A1)
is only 9 percent. Second, transaction costs are likely to be substantial. Consider
two victims and let P represent the probability of acceptance instead of holding out.
If Zδ represents the appropriable surplus from holding out given the common offer v –
cp + δ, the proposed mixed strategy satisfies 𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑣𝑣 + 𝑍𝑍𝛿𝛿 ) + (1 −
𝛿𝛿 𝑍𝑍

𝑃𝑃)(𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 ), and 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑣𝑣 ( 𝑣𝑣𝛿𝛿 + 𝜆𝜆)−1.

Because of the high holdout probability, modest

transaction costs should be sufficient to induce the injurer to forgo making the
settlement offer.
B. Proofs
Proposition 3: Subtracting marginal liability (5) from marginal social cost (4),
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)�𝑛𝑛�𝑣𝑣 + 𝑎𝑎 ∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 �� − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ] − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗ }

(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)[𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎∗ 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ]
Substituting the equilibrium suit probability
1

𝑛𝑛

(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) �𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 � 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛−1 �
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 . ∎

Proposition 4: If a victim chooses to sue, under joinder, his payoff is:
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𝑛𝑛 − 1 𝑛𝑛−1
1
𝑛𝑛 − 1 𝑛𝑛−2
�
� 𝑎𝑎 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)0 �𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 � + �
� 𝑎𝑎 (1
0
𝑛𝑛
1
1
𝑛𝑛 − 1 0
− 𝑎𝑎)1 �𝑣𝑣 −
𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 � + ⋯ + �
� 𝑎𝑎 (1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
− 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 �𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 �

If he chooses to wait he gets v[1-(1-a)n-1]. Equating the two
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝

1 𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
�� � 𝑎𝑎 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)0 + � � 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)1 + ⋯ + �
� 𝑎𝑎1 (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 0
1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
+ (1 − a)𝑛𝑛 − (1 − a)𝑛𝑛 � = 𝑣𝑣[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 ]
𝑣𝑣 − 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝

1
(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛 ) = 𝑣𝑣(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 )
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎

The equilibrium strategy 𝑎𝑎� therefore satisfies
𝑎𝑎�𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛−1
λ=
1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛
where 𝑎𝑎�(n, λ) < 1. For the case where n = 2, 𝑎𝑎� = 2(1-λ)/(2-λ). The equilibrium
condition implies that 𝑎𝑎�n cannot go to zero or to infinity as n increases. The
solution for λ implies

𝜆𝜆

𝜆𝜆+ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑎�𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛→∞

λ

= 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 < 1.
𝑛𝑛→∞

Rewriting the solution:

� � [1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 ] = 𝑎𝑎�(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛−1
𝑛𝑛

Given the foregoing, this final expression implies that 𝑎𝑎� goes to zero.∎

Proposition 5: Marginal liability exceeds marginal social cost if:

(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)�𝑛𝑛�𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 + 𝑎𝑎 ∗ (𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 + 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 �� < 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗ )𝑛𝑛 ] − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗ }

which is equivalent to 𝜆𝜆̃ + 𝜋𝜋 < 1. ∎
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